Dans cet article, l'auteur explore les effets du Partenariat transpacifique (PTP) dans le contexte canadien ; il a d'abord recours au modèle gravitationnel traditionnel du commerce et utilise ensuite le cadre théorique de la gravité incluant les coû ts du commerce d 'Anderson et van Wincoop (2003) . Cela lui permet d'obtenir une évaluation de la croissance des échanges commerciaux du Canada avec chacun de ses principaux partenaires commerciaux. Il montre ainsi que la croissance du commerce bilatéral entre le Canada et chacun des membres potentiels du PTP peut être principalement attribuée à la croissance de la production, alors que la très grande partie de la croissance du commerce avec des pays non membres du PTP est liée à la réduction des coû ts du commerce. De plus, l'élimination des barrières commerciales après la mise en oeuvre d'un traité de libre-échange entraîne une très grande diminution des coû ts du commerce et une augmentation du commerce bilatéral.
Introduction
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the most notable regional trade agreement that Canada has negotiated since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was established almost two decades ago. The TPP negotiations commenced in late 2008 and were concluded in October 2015, and the enforcement of the deal now awaits formal ratification by each member country. The TPP is a regional trade agreement that originally consisting of the United States (until January 23, 2017), Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. 1 The original set of 12 countries, including the United States, together accounted for approximately 40 percent of the world's gross domestic product (GDP). Figure 1a shows the original prospective members of the TPP. Since the agreement was concluded, numerous concerns have been raised not just by the policy-makers belonging to the member nations but also by the general public in virtually all the participant countries. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the United States from the deal soon after the inauguration of its new president was prompted by some of these concerns. The conclusion of the deal has triggered policy debates at national and global levels and has brought about a vast number of studies and reports intended to gauge the costs and benefits expected to accrue to the remaining 11 countries involved, currently referred to as the TPP-11. More interesting is that the key findings obtained by most media reports and analyses focusing on Canada largely contradict one another and use methodologies that are far from robust.
The goal of this study is to offer forecasts of the growth of bilateral trade flows between Canada and potential TPP member countries and the probable change in Canada's global linkages by using evidence from its trade patterns during the recent past. I seek to accomplish this objective by applying a methodology extensively used in the trade literature. I apply the traditional gravity model of trade to assess its predictions in the context of Canada and, subsequently, follow the technique of Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2011) by using the theoretical gravity framework incorporating trade costs by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . One of the main contributions of the study is that it describes a decomposition of the growth of Canada's bilateral trade flow with each of its top trading partners, paying special attention to the TPP member countries. I conclude that by lowering Canada's costs of exporting to and importing from the member countries, the TPP can lead to growth in Canada's bilateral trade. Although the results derived in this article are based on aggregate trade flows between countries, ignore cross-industry heterogeneity, and are therefore far from complete, the article offers useful insights into the possible outcomes of signing the TPP.
Several comprehensive industry-level analyses have nonetheless emerged since the announcement of the deal in June 2012. Rude and An (2013) examine the impact on supply management in the dairy sector in the context of tariff liberalization in Canada. Provided that the extent of tariff liberalization is only modest, they predict minimal impact on dairy farmer welfare and quota values. In another more recent study, Carey and Holmes (2017) assess the potential effect of TPP on automotive production and employment in Canada. Given that Canada already has sizable levels of automotive trade with two of the TPP-11 members (Mexico and Japan) and rising automotive imports from two likely future TPP members (South Korea and China), the ratification of the agreement will characterize a critical step for the automotive industry. The most notable conclusion of the study is that, although there may well be both winners and losers among automotive suppliers in Canada, the impact on automotive production in Canada is generally expected to be negative. Nevertheless, both of these studies rely on the assumption of US ratification of the TPP; thus, most implications need to reviewed in the light of US withdrawal from the deal.
It is worthwhile to briefly examine Canada's existing trade agreements. Table 1 provides a summary of Canada's free trade agreements (FTAs), including those that are concluded to date as well as those already brought in force. The table also lists the agreements that are still under negotiation (e.g., that with Japan, India, and Singapore). Of the TPP-11 countries, Canada has already concluded and brought into force an FTA with Mexico, Chile, and Peru. These countries currently enjoy nearly duty-free access to Canadian consumers and firms.
The empirical methodology used in this article draws on Canada's exports and imports data for the countries listed in Table 2. The table lists Canada's top bilateral trading relationships in 2014 measured by the value of trade and share of Canada's total world trade accounted for by each country. It also reports the trade balance with respect to each of its top trading partners. Accordingly, our sample consists of 28 countries that together accounted for more than 90 percent of Canada's trade volume in 2014. Figure 1b illustrates the sample of Canada's major trading partners. Figure 2 plots the evolution of Canada's trade flows by country over the time period under consideration . Figure 2a , which presents the total volume of exports to and imports from the United States, illustrates a remarkable surge in trade on the implementation of Canada-US FTA in 1989, later superseded by the NAFTA in 1994. Canada has had a trade balance surplus with the United States over the past quarter century, and the United States captured more than 65 percent of Canada's total world trade in 2014. Of the remaining 10 TPP member countries, in the most recent years Canada experienced a trade surplus only with Australia, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam.
One of the concerns raised by the opponents of the TPP in Canada is that, other than the United States, the volume of Canadian imports has exceeded that of its exports with respect to a greater majority of TPP member countries. If brought in force, the TPP may result in a further escalation of imports coming into Canada and a mounting trade deficit with respect to these countries. Such a trend has been observed in the case of Mexico subsequent to the endorsement of NAFTA in 1994 and also on the enactment of the Canada-Chile FTA in 1997 and the Canada-Peru FTA in 2009 . Figure 2b illustrates this phenomenon by indicating with a vertical line in the trade flow graphs for Mexico, Peru, and Chile the year in which these FTAs were signed. Although opponents' apprehension cannot be completely disregarded, the relatively small share of Canada's global trade constituted by some of the TPP member countries is worth mentioning. Apart from Mexico and Japan, which accounted for 3.3 percent and 2.3 percent of Canada's total world trade in 2014, each of the other member countries captured less than 0.4 percent of total Canadian trade flow in 2014 (see Table 2 ).
Use of the gravity model of trade in the context of the TPP has been motivated by a large number of empirical studies that used that technique after the implementation of NAFTA. For example, Gould (1998) used the gravity approach in determining how NAFTA altered the growth of North American trade. Krueger (1999 Krueger ( , 2000 inspected the shifting patterns of trade flows and notes that there is not much evidence that imports from the rest of the world dropped as intra-NAFTA trade soared. By conducting a shift-in-share analysis, she discovered that the upsurge in Mexico's share of its trade with the United States was not considerably different than that with the rest of the world.
One contribution of this article is its focus on the long-run evolution of bilateral trade costs in explaining the growth of Canada's trade with its key trading partners. I use a comprehensive micro-founded measure of aggregate bilateral trade costs derived by Jacks et al.'s (2011) study of trade booms and busts based on historical data. Trade costs are defined as all the costs of transaction and transport associated with the exchange of goods across national borders, including not just the observable barriers such as tariffs and transport costs but also other macroeconomic frictions that are more challenging to observe, such as the costs of overcoming language barriers and exchange rate risk. Similar to the methodology used by Head and Ries (2001) , they find this measure by backing out the trade cost wedge inferred from the gravity equation, which is defined as the difference between observed trade flows and a hypothetical benchmark of frictionless trade. This technique of inferring trade costs from readily available trade flow data circumvents the constraints of collecting data on each distinct trade cost element and, thus, possesses obvious advantages for applied research in the field of international economics (Jacks 2013; Novy 2013) . Figure  3 displays the progression of Jacks-Meissner-Novy measure of trade cost for Canada with respect to the TPP member countries from 1995 to 2010. Changes in Canada's bilateral trade with its major trading partners are consequently ascribed to either changes in GDP growth or changes in trade costs, with a particular emphasis on the remaining TPP member countries. The study is organized as follows. In the next section, I briefly describe the gravity model of trade and the empirical methodology, built on the theoretical foundations provided by the well-known Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model. In the third section, I provide the empirical estimates of the gravity model of Canada's international trade and present a decomposition of the growth of Canadian bilateral trade flows. The fourth section provides a policy discussion of the results, and the final section concludes the article and proposes ideas for further research.
Methodology

Gravity Equation
The legitimacy and usefulness of the gravity model of international trade has been well established in the literature both theoretically and empirically. In this article, I apply the standard estimating equation in gravity models:
where x ijt represents nominal bilateral exports from country i to j in time t. The y it and y jt terms represent nominal GDPs in countries i and j, and Z ijt is a row vector of variables representing the numerous bilateral frictions that restrict the flow of goods between countries i and j, such as the physical distance separating countries. m t represents annual dummies, and m j represents country fixed effects intended to capture differences in factors such as resource endowments and productivity and to take into account any other time-invariant characteristic that may influence a country's propensity to import from or export to Canada. We use the annual trade and output data obtained from the United Nations Comtrade database (United Nations Statistics Division 2016) to estimate the gravity model of trade using two different estimation techniques, namely, the ordinary least squares and Poisson pseudomaximum likelihood estimation to take care of heteroscedasticity as recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . I include measures for distance, the existence of a common language, and the existence of an FTA, along with time and country dummies. The results (described in the next section) are reported in Table 3 using OLS estimation and Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. The 28 countries in the sample are as follows: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Chile, China, Democratic Republic of Korea, European Union, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam. Figure 1b displays the sample of countries used in the empirical estimation.
The results retrieved from the estimation of the gravity equation are typically consistent with the predictions of the model. However, there is one interesting exception: The coefficient of the indicator variable for the existence of a common language persistently turned out to be negative and significant. This finding seems counterintuitive, given that one would suspect countries with the same official language to engage in greater bilateral trade than countries that speak a different language. To investigate the cause of this rather unusual result, I split the sample into before and after 2005 and ran the model only for the pre-2005 set of observations. Later, I did the same for the sample before 2000 and, finally, for the group of observations before 1995. The rationale for restricting the sample to these time periods is based on the expectation that the importance of having a common language has substantially diminished over time. As illustrated in the following section and in Table 4 , this is precisely what happened.
Gravity Redux
To identify the sources of and quantify the potential changes in Canada's bilateral trade with its major trading partners as a result of its participation in an international trade agreement such as the TPP, this study follows the technique of Jacks et al. (2011) , using the theoretical gravity framework that incorporates trade costs by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . It follows Head and Ries (2001) and Novy (2013) in eliminating the multilateral resistance variables from the gravity equation derived by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . This step uses the counterpart of their gravity equation for domestic trade and yields an expression for the tariff equivalent of trade costs:
À1; ð2Þ
where t ij is the trade cost wedge that captures bilateral relative to domestic trade costs. x ij represents nominal bilateral exports from country i to j, and s > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) show that the elasticity of substitution, s, normally falls in the range (5,10). As done in Jacks et al. (2011) , I set the value of s to eight, which is approximately the midpoint of this range. 2 Equation (2), along with the trade and output data, can be used to construct bilateral trade cost measures for the 28 country pairs in the sample. Because they lacked consistent data, Jacks et al. (2011) used GDP less aggregate exports as a measure of domestic trade. They consider the following function for trade costs that is widely used in the gravity literature:
where dist is a measure of distance between two countries, x ijt is a row vector of observable determinants of trade costs, and e ijt is the error term composed of unobservables. 3 On the basis of Equation (3) 
Helpman (1987) and Baier and Bergstrand (2001) split the product of outputs into the sum of outputs and output shares, y i y j ¼ ðy i þ y j Þ 2 s i s j with s i ¼ y i =ðy i þ y j Þ, such that I too use the following form of decomposition:
Thus, the growth of bilateral trade can be decomposed into four components. The first term on the righthand side characterizes the contribution of output growth to bilateral trade growth. The second term on the right-hand side is the contribution of increasing income similarity (Helpman 1987) , that is, two countries of the same size are expected to trade more than two countries of unequal sizes, all else being equal. The third term reveals the contribution of changes in trade costs, and the fourth term embodies changes in multilateral factors. 4 As mentioned earlier, the purpose of the decomposition is to disclose the various sources of Canadian bilateral trade growth by associating it with output growth as well as with changes in the bilateral trade cost measure.
Empirical Results
I estimated Equation (1) using the GDP of the importing and exporting countries, the distance between the importing and exporting countries as a proxy for trade costs, and year dummies and trading partner's fixed effects. The results are reported in the first half of Table  3 . Although all of the columns take account of country effects, year dummies are excluded in Columns 1 and 3. The findings obtained are in line with expectations; the coefficients for GDP are indeed estimated to be significant and positive across all columns in Table 3 . Similarly, distance appears to be negatively related to bilateral trade flows. Not surprisingly, the existence of an FTA is found to be positively and significantly correlated with bilateral trade flows, as revealed in Columns 1-2. Columns 3 and To scrutinize the potential cause of this rather puzzling result, I appealed to the expectation of drastically weakened significance of speaking a common language in the past couple of decades, especially owing to China's thriving role in global trade flows. To test this hypothesis, I ran the gravity model only for the set of observations before 2005; the resulting estimates are provided in Table 4 . As predicted, the coefficient of common language now becomes positive, and this result is highly significant (see Column 1). This result suggests that before 2005, having a common language with Canada (i.e., English or French as the official language) was associated with engaging in more bilateral trade. Nonetheless, one may question the criterion for choosing 2005. I repeated this procedure for two additional threshold years, namely, 2000 and 1995. These results are presented in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 , respectively. I again obtained a positive and significant effect of language on bilateral trade flows. What may seem to be another fascinating outcome is that as the sample is limited to a period further back in time (say, 1995 instead of 2005) , the magnitude of the positive and significant influence of common language on trade is even further elevated. For example, in the pre-2005 sample of observations, the significant coefficient of common language is 1.303. This value goes up to 1.556 when the sample is restricted to the before-2000 set of observations, and further goes up to 2.421 when as the sample is reduced to the before-1995 set of observations. Hence, despite the somehow counterintuitive results reported in Table 3 , when it comes to interpreting the coefficient of the common language dummy variable, a particularly appealing outcome is discovered pertaining to the diminishing role of common official language in explaining the growth of bilateral trade flow. This effect is evident at least in the Canadian data, and it is somewhat tempting to test its validity for a larger group of countries. Now that the soundness of the gravity model of trade in the Canadian context and the importance of GDP, distance, and numerous other characteristics in explaining Canada's bilateral trade with its major trading partners have been established, I turn to the primary objective of this study. As noted earlier, this study follows the technique of Jacks et al. (2011) , using the theoretical gravity framework to categorize the sources of and quantify the probable gains to Canada's bilateral trade with its major trading partners as a result of its membership in the TPP. Henceforth, the decomposition of the growth of bilateral trade presented in Equation (5) is used to achieve this goal. The results are presented in Table 5 , which helps to illustrate the forces at work rather distinctly.
The final columns in Table 5 display the mean percentage growth in trade volume for the sample of countries used in this article, both as a whole and for individual countries. These averages are weighted by the GDP of the trading partners. The first half of Table 5 provides an overview of these averages for the TPP-11, and the second half does the same for Canada's largest trading partners that are not prospective members of TPP. Although the sample averages for all countries combined, TPP members, and TPP non-members are broadly comparable, the mean growth of bilateral trade varies enormously across individual countries, as do the key driving forces. The GDP weighted average growth of international trade is 14.9 percentage points for the full sample of countries and only 9.9 percentage points for the prospective TPP members alone and 16.06 percentage points for non-member countries. Nevertheless, the average growth is much higher for a large number of individual countries, both TPP members and nonmembers, including Chile (41.6 percentage points), Vietnam (49.9 percentage points), Mexico (31.0 percentage points), Peru (64.7 percentage points), China (45.7 percentage points), and India (32.1 percentage points).
Let us now turn to the four components of the average growth of trade. The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (5) illustrates the contribution of output growth, once again weighted by trading partner GDP. The second term indicates the impact of increasing income similarity, and the third term displays the contribution of changes in trade costs. This effect is, of course, based on the implicit assumption that aggregate trade costs are exogenous to trade and economic growth and that trade cost declines do not cause additional income growth. The last term embodies variation in multilateral factors. For the sample of Canada's top trade partners, reduction in the trade cost measure accounts for a majority (6.4 percentage points) of the growth in international trade, whereas for the TPP-11 member countries alone, it explains only 3.0 percentage points of trade growth. However, the respective figure for TPP non-member group of countries turns out to be much higher (7.2 percentage points). There is, however, a tremendous amount of disparity across nations within each of the two groups resulting from the cross-country differences in payments frictions as well as declines in international transport costs. There is relatively lesser variation in the contributions of increasing income similarity and growth in output across countries within groups.
Both groups embrace wide-ranging experiences across individual countries. Growth of trade with TPP member countries seems to be associated more with output growth, whereas a vast majority of trade growth with the non-member countries is related to declines in inferred trade costs. Even though the GDP weighted mean for the TPP member countries is only 3.0 percentage points, there are quite a few exceptions: Mexico at 21.3 percentage points, Peru at 50.9 percentage points, Chile at 27.3 percentage points and Vietnam at 50.4 percentage points. This result is particularly consistent with the fact that elimination of trade barriers and diminution of tariff rates after putting FTAs into effect decreased trade costs with Chile, Peru, and Mexico. Henceforth, the execution of TPP is predicted to bring about significant reductions in trade costs for a broader subset of TPP member countries (e.g., Singapore and New Zealand) and a probable overall growth in Canada's international trade.
The output-related expansion in trade volumes is fairly consistent across countries with the growth figures ranging from 4.3 to 7.9 percentage points, and with the only exception of China (11.2 percentage points). Output growth dominated all other sources of trade growth in the case of a large number of TPP member countries (see Column 1, first half of Table 5 ). These results are in line with the traditional gravity models that predict output growth in the trading countries to have a consistently positive impact on the volume of trade flow between them. Furthermore, endorsement of the TPP can potentially give rise to dynamic gains for the participant countries in the form of higher output growth, which, in turn, can lead to further strengthening of international linkages with the member countries. If trade cost declines are assumed to be endogenous to economic growth and, consequently, trigger additional income growth, the contribution of growth in output as reported in Column 1 is likely to be understated. The second term on the right-hand side of Equation (5) is the impact of enhancing income similarity between the trading countries, because two countries of the same size are projected to trade more than are two countries of asymmetrical size. Apart from a small number of exceptions, the contribution of income similarity has persistently remained lowest for Canada's top trading partners. Singapore has the highest magnitude at 3.6 percentage points among all the countries, whereas the GDP weighted average of the TPP member nations only stands at 0.3 percentage points. Finally, the role of variation in multilateral factors (lnðx ii x jj =y i y j Þ) is markedly divergent, inexplicable in several instances and at times even negative. The contribution of these factors is indicated in Column 4 of Table 5 . Because the final term captures the role of domestic trade (GDP minus aggregate exports) as a fraction of the product of both countries' aggregate incomes, there is an enormous amount of disparity across Canada's top trading partners and even an adverse effect on the average growth of bilateral trade between Canada and some countries (including Vietnam, Malaysia, Belgium, and Italy).
Discussion
The representatives of the remaining 11 signatories to the TPP, as well as China, Colombia, and South Korea, met in Chile in March 2017 for the first time since the US president announced the withdrawal of the United States from the TPP. On the basis of Chapter 30, Section 2, of the agreement, it is still possible for the agreement to come into force if a minimum of six signatories representing a combined 85 percent GDP ratify the agreement. The attendance by 15 Pacific Rim nations in Chile signaled a consensus across the Asia Pacific region that free trade and regional integration is an effective way to stimulate the exchange of commodities and investment. As shown in the Empirical Results section, much of the growth of trade with TPP-11 countries seems to be linked to output expansion. The only exceptions are countries with which a FTA is already in force. Because of dwindling trade restrictions after an FTA is put into effect, reduction in trade costs markedly accounts for the growth of bilateral trade flow: Mexico at 21.3 percentage points and Peru at 50.9 percentage points are two examples. Thus, a constructive expansion of Canadian international linkages decisively depends on its participation in a big trading network, such as the TPP, or effective ongoing bilateral FTA negotiations with various Pacific Rim countries, including Japan and Singapore. Wonnacott (1975) argues that the growing subdivision of the world into trade blocs had a predominantly undesirable effect on Canada when it was the only remaining industrially developed Western country without free access to one of the larger markets in the world. That study recommended that Canada support the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations. However, the study also suggested that any Canadian FTA requires that the United States be one of the partners and lists the reasons why such an association would be economically more beneficial than a similar arrangement with any other country or group of countries. The US endorsement of TPP was disputed ever since its conclusion in October 2015, culminating in the US withdrawal from the multilateral trade agreement altogether. Instead, the United States has shown interest in negotiating individual bilateral agreements with some of these countries, particularly with Japan. The resulting outcome is, henceforth, rather complex for Canada and the countries that already have bilateral trade deals with the United States, in particular because the United States has called for a renegotiation of the NAFTA.
The estimates reported in a study published by the Peterson Institute for International Economics suggest that the TPP will increase annual real incomes in Canada by $37 billion and annual exports by $58 billion over baseline projections by 2030 when the agreement is nearly fully implemented (Petri and Plummer 2016) . The study does warn that even though most workers who lose jobs do find alternative employment, workers in specific industries or with skill shortages may experience serious transition costs. For instance, by eliminating tariffs on Japanese vehicles and making it simpler for manufacturers to use offshore parts, the local auto parts makers would be prone to losing domestic demand. It may possibly lead to a higher Canadian import penetration by vehicles built in Japan because of their added price competitiveness subsequent to the removal of the 6.1 percent tariff, in addition to the consequence of weaker rules of origin for both vehicles and parts (Carey and Holmes, 2017) . Moreover, the inclusion of parts from low-cost countries both within and outside the TPP may prove to be detrimental for Canadian production of auto parts. The effect of any FTA is to divert trade away from non-members toward members, with tangible losses for China, India, Thailand, and South Korea in the case of TPP-11. In fact, it is for that reason that both China and South Korea have expressed interest in being parties to a trans-Pacific trade deal, marked by their presence in the trade talks held in Chile in March 2017.
A remarkable observation from the historical studies that emerged just before the conclusion of NAFTA in the early 1990s is the resemblance these arguments carry to those that are raised in the present day vis-à-vis the TPP. In their 1993 article, Cadsby and Woodside challenge the popular belief at the time that the economic effects of NAFTA would be trivial and only marginally favourable to Canada. They maintain that Canada's participation in a multilateral trade agreement would be preferable to the conceivable alternative of bilateral agreements from which Canada is excluded. Along similar lines, the TPP may instigate some trade substitution away from Canadian and toward Asian commodities, but it can grant Canadian firms relatively unfettered access to the trans-Pacific countries. Moreover, with the rise of China and other Asian countries, coupled with unprecedented technological advances, today Canada faces more arduous challenges than it did in 1994. Canadian policy-makers have already commenced FTA negotiations with some of the TPP-11 countries, as shown in Table 1 . It appears meaningful to attend to areas such as energy, e-commerce, environmental, and labour issues as a part of any imminent trade deal. Jeffrey J. Schott (2016) mentions in the overview chapter of his book Trans-Pacific Partnership: An Assessment that the TPP is an FTA upgrader, because it considerably updates the less comprehensive pacts between pairs of TPP countries in such areas. Although the TPP negotiations are still underway, addressing some of these concerns in bilateral trade agreements does appear valuable.
Conclusion and Way Forward
A question that understandably interests Canadian policymakers and citizens at present is what influence the enactment of TPP-11 will have on Canadian trade flows, income, and employment. In this study, I used annual trade and output data for Canada and its major trade partners to evaluate the potential sources of growth in Canada's bilateral trade with the prospective TPP member countries. I ran the standard gravity regressions using two different estimation techniques, the ordinary least squares and Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation, and established that gravity exerts a predictable pull in explaining the pattern of Canada's international trade; the coefficients on GDP are indeed estimated to be significant and positive, and distance appears to be negatively related to bilateral trade flows after controlling for country as well as time effects. However, what may come as a surprise is the negative and highly significant coefficient of the common language dummy variable. A particularly interesting result related to the diminishing role of a common official language in explaining the growth of bilateral trade flow. This effect is plainly manifest in the Canadian data, and it may perhaps be tempting to test its validity for a larger group of countries.
Following the rationale for the use of a gravity model of trade, and with the help of a micro-founded measure of trade costs derived by Jacks et al. (2011) , changes in Canada's bilateral trade are attributed to two ultimate forces: changes in output growth and changes in trade costs. For the sample of Canada's top trade partners, a fall in the trade cost measure accounts for a majority (6.4 percentage points) of the growth in international trade, whereas for the TPP member countries alone, it explains an apparent minority (3.0 percentage points) of trade growth. There is, nevertheless, a great amount of disparity across nations: Mexico at 21.3 percentage points, Peru at 50.9 percentage points, Chile at 27.3 percentage points, and Vietnam at 50.4 percentage points. This effect is principally consistent with the fact that elimination of trade barriers and shrinking tariff rates after putting FTAs into effect reduced trade costs with Chile, Peru, and Mexico. Analogously, the implementation of TPP is projected to bring about significant reductions in trade costs for a broader set of member countries. Furthermore, growth of trade with TPP member countries seems to be related more to output growth. Output growth dominated all other sources of trade growth in the case of a large number of TPP member countries, and output-related expansion in trade volumes is rather consistent across countries with the growth figures ranging from 4.3 to 7.9 percentage points (with the exception of China).
The results presented in this article ought to be used as a preface to a more detailed examination of trade flows between Canada and its trade partners. Trade is much more complex than the aggregate data imply, and there is a great amount of product heterogeneity both within and between standard product categories. Canada and its trade partners exchange hundreds of different goods, and economic analyses of trade based on aggregate data instead of focusing on individual commodity and product groups must be viewed with caution. Clearly, disaggregated industry-level analyses need to be carried out not just to identify sectors most likely to suffer from short-term losses as a result of TPP, but also to recognize the industries in which Canada's comparative advantage truly lies. Furthermore, a detailed account of Canadian tariffs on imports from the TPP-11 countries is necessary for a comprehensive assessment of predicted changes in patterns of imports of foreign raw materials.
Notes
1 The number of countries involved in the TPP grew over the course of the talks (Schott 2016 Jacks et al. (2011) report that the level of inferred trade costs is sensitive to the assumed parameter value. Nonetheless, the change over time is almost unaffected by this choice of the value of s. 3 The determinants taken into consideration in Jacks et al.'s (2011) study of historical trade booms and busts included distance between two countries, the establishment of fixed exchange rate regimes, the existence of a common language, membership in a European overseas empire, and the existence of a shared border, and all regressions included timeinvariant country fixed effects as well as year fixed effects. 4 Consequently, I do not estimate Equation (5) and instead decompose the growth of bilateral trade conditional on the theoretical gravity framework.
